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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

*Soviet Seaborne Shipments
to North Vietnam: Plans for 1968*

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APRIL 1968

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
April 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Soviet Seaborne Shipments to North Vietnam:
Plans for 1968

Summary

The USSR has announced plans to increase sea-borne shipments to North Vietnam by 20 percent in 1968. The implied growth in North Vietnamese imports from the USSR above the 1967 level is [redacted]
[redacted] less than the increases [redacted] in 1966
or [redacted] in 1967. About 30 additional ship arrivals would be needed to carry the increase in tonnage planned for 1968.

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In the first quarter of 1968, imports from the USSR ran 30 percent higher than the monthly average in 1967. All of this increase consisted of shipments of petroleum and foodstuffs; these commodities probably account for most of the planned growth for the year.

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Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research.

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Planned Increase for 1968

1. The Soviet Ministry of the Maritime Fleet has announced that deliveries by Soviet ships to Haiphong* will increase by 20 percent in 1968.

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An increase of this size would be smaller in both relative and absolute terms than those in 1966 and 1967. The year of greatest growth was 1966, when North Vietnam's imports from the USSR rose 39 percent.

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* About 99 percent of North Vietnam's imports by sea in 1967 were delivered to the port of Haiphong.


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The pace at which petroleum will be imported in the remainder of the year will depend for the most part on the level of economic and logistic activity; actual imports of foodstuffs will depend on the results of the rice harvests. Imports of these commodities probably account for most of the planned increase in total seaborne imports from the USSR in 1968.

Ship Arrivals and Congestion

3. A 20-percent increase in Soviet exports to North Vietnam in 1968 would require approximately 30 additional ship arrivals and would raise the monthly average of Soviet ship arrivals from 15.1 per month in 1967 to 17.6 per month in 1968. Monthly averages of Soviet ship arrivals since the beginning of 1965 are as follows:

	<u>Monthly Averages</u>			
	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>First Quarter 1968</u>
Ship arrivals	6.6	10.2	15.1	18.0

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4. Thirty additional Soviet ship arrivals during 1968 should not worsen ship congestion in Haiphong appreciably. Many will be tankers, which are easier to schedule, and which do not compete with dry cargo ships for berths and cargo-handling equipment.

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